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We develop a model of immigrant political action that connects individual 
motivations to become politically involved with the context in which 
participation takes place. The article posits that opinion climates in the 
form of hostility or openness toward immigrants shape the opportunity 
structure for immigrant political engagement by contributing to the social 
costs and political benefits of participation. We argue that friendly opinion 
climates toward immigrants enable political action among immigrants, and 
facilitate the politicization of political discontent. Using survey data from 
the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002 to 2010 in 25 European democracies, 
our analyses reveal that more positive opinion climates—at the level of 
countries and regions—increase immigrant political engagement, especially 
among immigrants dissatisfied with the political system. However, this effect 
is limited to uninstitutionalized political action, as opinion climates have no 
observable impact on participation in institutionalized politics.
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International migration has manifold, complex, and profound effects on the 
migrants as well as migrant sending and receiving countries. In Europe as 
elsewhere, one important issue in debates on immigration has been whether 
immigrants do or should have opportunities to express their views and how 
they make use of these opportunities. To date, however, we have little sys-
tematic research on what encourages migrants to engage in political action 
and the role that host country’s environment plays in this respect.
This article develops a model of immigrant political action that connects 
individual motivations to become politically involved with the sociopolitical 
context in which political participation takes place. We posit that a country’s 
opinion climate in the form of hostility or openness toward immigrants is a 
critical determinant of immigrant political engagement. Specifically, a 
friendly opinion climate is an important stimulant of immigrant participation 
in two ways: first, openness toward immigrants reduces the social costs of 
political action among immigrants and enhances their perception that politi-
cal action will be acceptable and efficacious; second, in reducing the social 
costs of participation, a positive opinion climate facilitates the translation of 
political discontent into political engagement among immigrants.
We test these arguments using cross-national and individual-level data 
from the European Social Survey (ESS) collected in 25 European democra-
cies from 2002 to 2010. Our analyses reveal that more positive opinion cli-
mates toward immigrants increase foreigners’ political engagement, and this 
effect is particularly strong among those who are dissatisfied with the politi-
cal system. However, the effect is limited to uninstitutionalized political 
action, as the opinion climate has no observable impact on participation in 
institutionalized politics.
Our article contributes to research on anti-immigrant attitudes and immi-
grant political participation in several ways. First, on a theoretical level, we 
highlight the critical and complex role that the sociopolitical context in the 
form of public opinion toward immigrants plays in shaping immigrant politi-
cal engagement. In doing so, we go beyond existing research on formal insti-
tutions and political actors and investigate a central, but hitherto 
underexamined aspect of the broader social environment—captured at 
national and regional levels—that shapes immigrant political engagement. 
Second, we seek to combine the study of anti-immigrant opinion with the 
study of immigrant political participation by considering anti-immigrant atti-
tudes as a key independent, rather than dependent, variable. Third, by distin-
guishing theoretically and empirically between different types of political 
acts, we extend the scholarly focus beyond electoral participation—a type of 
participation many immigrants are not entitled to—and develop a more com-
prehensive view of the role that sociopolitical context and individual-level 
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determinants play in shaping immigrant political engagement. Finally, our 
analysis goes beyond the most heavily studied case of immigrant participa-
tion—the United States—and puts existing arguments to a test against a var-
ied and extensive sample of European nations with diverse immigrant 
populations.
Macro Context and Political Participation
While the social and political environment has long been known to systemati-
cally shape people’s political engagement (Huckfeldt, 1986; Zuckerman, 
2005),1 most existing research focuses on the consequences of individual 
characteristics and the immediate political environment. Few studies have 
considered how the wider political community, or macro sociopolitical con-
text, influences people’s political engagement. This is perhaps not surprising, 
given that most studies of political participation have been conducted in 
single-country settings where the macrocontext is held constant.
The use of a single-country design has two important drawbacks, how-
ever; for one, it is difficult to establish whether the individual-level factors 
that drive political behavior in one country also play a role in other countries. 
It is easy to imagine that such factors may have dissimilar effects on individu-
als exposed to different political, social, and cultural contexts. But more 
importantly, for the purpose of this analysis, single-country studies cannot 
systematically assess the consequences of countries’ macroenvironment for 
people’s political engagement.
Within the literature on immigrants, researchers have argued that standard 
explanations of political behavior, such as the socioeconomic model, are 
helpful but insufficient for understanding immigrant political behavior (Cho, 
Gimpel, & Wu, 2006; Ramakrishnan, 2005). This is because being an immi-
grant means having a set of experiences with country of origin and host coun-
try (e.g., Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; White, Nevitte, 
Blais, Gidengil, & Fournier, 2008). However, little systematic cross-national 
research exists on the consequences of sociopolitical environment for immi-
grant political action due to the fact that most studies focus on only one or 
few countries (or cities) in their analyses.
The general question we seek to answer below, then, is how immigrants’ 
exposure to their environment, measured at the levels of countries and 
regions, affects the patterns of immigrants’ political engagement. Specifically, 
does hostility toward immigrants breed political mobilization or apathy 
among foreigners? And do opinion climates affect various participatory acts 
differently? We contend that opinion climates matter to immigrants’ 
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engagement in politics and the reasons have to do with the costs and benefits 
of political action.
Opinion Climates and Immigrant Political Action
It has been long known that people’s political ideas, attitudes, and behaviors 
are influenced by their perceptions of what others do or think (Cooley, 1956; 
Mutz, 1998). Individuals constantly (and to a large extent unconsciously) 
scan their environment to assess which opinions the majority may come to 
favor and which ones might lead to social exclusion (Scheufele & Moy, 
2000). In her classic work on the spiral of silence, Noelle-Neumann (1974, 
1993) argued that people become less likely to express their political views 
as they perceive themselves to occupy a more extreme minority position in 
the population (see also Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997). Consistent with 
this perspective, a number of studies have shown that opinion polls affect 
voter turnout and vote choice (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Atkin, 1969; 
de Bock, 1976; Lavrakas, Holley, & Miller, 1991; Skalaban, 1988; West, 
1991), and that electoral behavior is sensitive to exit polls and early election 
returns (Delli Carpini, 1984; Sudman, 1986) as well as voters’ perceptions of 
the popularity of the candidates (Bartels, 1988).
Related research on social psychology reveals that individuals who belong 
to subordinate or less powerful groups are significantly more attuned to their 
environment and pay more attention to shifts even in the affective and non-
verbal tone of dominant group members (Frable, 1997; Hall & Briton, 1993; 
Oyserman & Swim, 2001). Because immigrants perceive themselves to be in 
an inferior and stigmatized social position due to their outsider status in their 
host societies, we expect them to be especially sensitive to the social environ-
ment with important consequences for their political behavior.
We conceptualize the political climate that people experience as a social 
constraint that increases the costs of political participation. Such costs come 
in the form of the actual or perceived social acceptability of expressing a 
minority opinion and the consequences this entails (Muller & Opp, 1986; 
Opp, 1986). High social costs discourage immigrant political engagement, 
whereas reduced costs create incentives for political mobilization. We argue 
that immigrants are more likely to engage politically if they feel appreciated 
and welcomed by the native populations. In contrast, perceptions of hostility 
and stigmatized social status are likely to increase the social costs of partici-
pation, resulting in lower levels of participation.
By conceptualizing a country’s opinion climate as a social constraint, we 
define it as separate from a country’s formal institutions or policies. 
However, thinking of it as a constraint allows us to interpret opinion 
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climates within the framework of a country’s political opportunity structure. 
Political opportunities—a concept developed most prominently in the litera-
ture on social movements—refer to “consistent—but not necessarily formal 
or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incen-
tives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or 
failure” (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Koopmans, Dyvendak, & 
Giugni, 1995; McAdam, 1982, 1996; Tarrow, 1998, pp. 76-77; Tilly, 1978). 
While political opportunities do not inevitably produce social movements, 
they often provide individuals with political grievances with strong incen-
tives for political mobilization.2 This is because favorable political opportu-
nities increase the chances that even weak and less assertive movements will 
succeed (Amenta, 2005; Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992; Amenta, 
Dunleavy, & Bernstein, 1994; Costain, 1992; Giugni, 2007; Kitschelt, 1986; 
Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, & Su, 1999).
Most scholars of social movements focus on formal state institutions and 
elite alignments to conceptualize and measure a country’s or region’s politi-
cal opportunity structure (McAdam, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1996). In line with this tradition, researchers of immigrant political engage-
ment have argued that a country’s legal and institutional framework—
particularly citizenship and residency laws—as well as political parties, trade 
unions, and other interest groups supportive of migration create opportunities 
for newcomers’ political engagement (Ireland, 1994, 2000; Koopmans, 1999, 
2004; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 
2005; Soininen, 1999; Statham, 1999; Togeby, 1999).
Though less commonly, informal features of the political opportunity 
structure have also been used in previous research. For example, Gamson and 
Meyer (1996) consider the public opinion climate—or what they refer to as 
the cultural climate, zeitgeist, or national mood—as an important element of 
the political opportunity structure for the emergence and success of social 
movements. Scholars of women’s movements argued that public opinion 
toward gender equality is part of the “gendered opportunity structure” that 
played an important role in women’s movements’ efforts to achieve their 
policy goals (Soule & Olzak, 2004). Similarly, public discourse on migration 
and ethnic relations in printed media has been treated as an indicator of the 
political opportunity structure for immigrant claim-making in several 
European countries and cities (Cinalli & Giugni, 2011; Koopmans, 2004).
Because the various elements that constitute a country’s political opportu-
nity structure act as external constraints to political action (Kitschelt, 1986; 
Tarrow, 1998), we expect that foreigners are more likely to engage in collec-
tive action if they perceive their political environment to be favorable to their 
concerns—that is, if the goals of participation are more likely to be realized. 
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Thus, countries that provide more opportunities for immigrants to express 
their grievances and to contribute to collective policy decision-making are 
likely to have more politically involved foreigners. In contrast, states that are 
hostile or closed to the expression of immigrants’ concerns are more likely to 
produce apathetic and alienated immigrants, whose grievances might occa-
sionally manifest through violence or crime among poor immigrants, and the 
return home or further migration to another location among highly skilled 
foreigners.
While the opportunity structure perspective suggests that openness begets 
immigrant engagement in politics, several single-country studies show that 
migrant mobilization often takes place under threatening circumstances. In 
the United States, for example, anti-immigrant legislation in the mid-1990s, 
which sought to restrict immigrant access to welfare benefits, had a positive 
impact on voting turnout among first- and second-generation immigrants 
(Pantoja, Ramirez, & Segura, 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2005, especially chap. 6; 
Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001). More recently, a study of Arab 
Americans in the aftermath of 9/11 reported that perceptions of threat associ-
ated with the Patriot Act legislation and incidents of racially motivated dis-
crimination and violence significantly increased voter registration among 
more educated Arab immigrants (Cho et al., 2006). Similarly in France, the 
political mobilization of Black Africans has been attributed primarily to their 
efforts to defend housing rights (Péchu, 1999), while in Belgium immigrant 
groups mobilized and rallied fiercely for their enfranchisement in response to 
growing anti-immigrant sentiment in electoral competition (Jacobs, 1999).
The two apparently contrasting perspectives—that hostility toward 
immigrants can mobilize or demobilize immigrant political action—may 
not be incompatible, however. After all, as Goldstone and Tilly (2001) point 
out, threat cannot be treated merely as a flip side of opportunity as increased 
threat does not always mean fewer opportunities.3 In other words, percep-
tions of threat to one’s rights or entitlements—or dissatisfaction with the 
political process more generally—are likely to have a different effect on 
political mobilization depending on the existing political opportunity struc-
tures. As a result, we expect that dissatisfaction with the political process is 
more likely to translate into political action under conditions of favorable 
opportunity structure, whereas political frustrations are likely to remain 
unexpressed in an environment of closed or restricted opportunities. Put 
differently, the political opportunity structure should be particularly impor-
tant in mobilizing immigrants for political action if it is connected to the 
expression of political discontent. This expectation is consistent with 
Tarrow’s argument that
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the concept of political opportunity structure emphasizes resources external to the 
group. Unlike money or power, these can be taken advantage of by even weak or 
disorganized challengers . . . Contentious politics emerges when ordinary citizens 
. . . respond to opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal 
potential allies, show where elites and authorities are most vulnerable, and trigger 
social networks and collective identities into action. (Tarrow, 1998, p. 20)
Welcoming environments should therefore encourage migrants to engage 
in politics, in particular because members of minority groups, such as immi-
grants, are more likely to become inhibited in expressing themselves and 
engaging in politics as the spiral of silence theory suggests (Noelle-
Neumann, 1993; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). We therefore hypothesize that the 
macrosocial context in the form of a country’s opinion climate toward immi-
grants will have a contingent effect on political participation. Specifically, 
positive opinion climates toward immigrants should increase political par-
ticipation among foreigners, but more powerfully among those with political 
grievances.
Opinion Climates, Discontent,  
and Varieties of Political Action
While early studies of political participation in democracies focused mostly 
on understanding standard modes of political engagement, such as electoral 
participation, the scope of inquiry into political engagement widened consid-
erably in the aftermath of popular unrest during the 1960s and 1970s, as 
researchers began to take into account a broader repertoire of political acts, 
including protest behavior. This expansion of the empirical terrain considered 
by behavioral researchers brought with it the conceptual distinction between 
the traditional conventional, institutionalized acts of participation on one 
hand, and unconventional, uninstitutionalized, action on the other (Barnes et 
al., 1979; Muller, 1979). Institutionalized action is defined as involving rou-
tine political acts (mostly) oriented toward electoral processes, while uninsti-
tutionalized participation is conceptualized as occurring outside of electoral 
politics and involving often more spontaneous, episodic, and disruptive polit-
ical acts (Kaase, 1989).
Considering the options available to individuals for engaging in politics, 
one important question is what motivates any particular act. Traditionally, in 
the context of established democracies, conventional political activities such 
as voting have been viewed as acts that affirm individuals’ allegiance to the 
political system. Consistent with this view, considerable evidence shows a 
strong correlation between positive attitudes about politics and the political 
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system (civic orientations) on one hand and participation in conventional 
political activities on the other (Finkel, 1985; Leighley, 1995; Rosenstone & 
Hansen, 1993; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). While political trust, combined 
with a strong sense of efficacy, encourage what Gamson and others have 
called “allegiant activity” by way of conventional access to governmental 
institutions and actors, a number of studies have found that mistrust and polit-
ical dissatisfaction increase engagement in unconventional political acts 
(Gamson, 1968; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Muller, 1977). Moreover, the con-
nection between dissatisfaction and unconventional participation appears to 
be particularly pronounced among political and ethnic minorities (Craig & 
Maggiotto, 1981; Shingles, 1981). This finding is consistent with the idea 
that unconventional politics provide an outlet for disadvantaged minorities, 
as well as other groups that lack access to politics through conventional chan-
nels and are alienated from the established political order (Dalton, 2006, pp. 
62-63). This means that, among immigrants, levels of unconventional partici-
pation should be higher than levels of conventional participation.
In light of these findings, we test several hypotheses below. First, we posit 
that dissatisfaction with the political system should be an important driver of 
political action among immigrants, and we expect it to be a more important 
determinant of unconventional than conventional political participation 
among foreign-born individuals. Second, if the opinion climate functions as 
part and parcel of a country’s opportunity structures, it should be a valuable 
catalyst for connecting immigrant discontent and unconventional political 
action. This means that we expect the impact of political dissatisfaction on 
participation to be especially powerful in countries that are marked by posi-
tive opinion climates vis-à-vis immigrants, particularly with respect to less 
institutionalized political acts.
Data and Analysis
Our general model of political action contains two basic elements: individual 
motivations and social context. First, we posit that, to understand immigrant 
political engagement, we require information about individuals’ motivations 
to participate; second, to understand cross-national and cross-regional differ-
ences in the levels of immigrant participation, we need to know the environ-
ment in which immigrants choose to engage in politics. Our model posits that 
these factors interact in shaping political action among immigrants: Those 
who are motivated to express political discontent are more likely to do so in 
environments characterized by a friendlier opinion climate toward them.
We estimate our models using data collected at the level of individuals 
from the ESS conducted from 2002 to 2010 (four-round cumulative file). 
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The ESS project is known for its high standards of methodological rigor in 
survey design and cross-national data collection (Kittilson, 2009).4 This 
project is also the only set of cross-national surveys that include questions 
about people’s attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, questions 
designed specifically for foreign-born, as well as standard items measuring 
political participation (it also is the only set of surveys that ask these ques-
tions in identical format across a range of countries). The relevant survey 
items were available for 25 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom.5
Dependent Variables
Institutionalized participation in politics is an additive index based on the fol-
lowing three activities respondents reported having engaged in during the past 
12 months: contacted a politician, government, or local government official; 
worked in a political party or action group; and worked in another organiza-
tion or association.6 Uninstitutionalized political participation is similarly 
based on whether a respondent reported having signed a petition, taken part in 
a lawful demonstration, and boycotted certain products for political, ethical, or 
environmental reasons (cf. de Rooij, 2012). Both indexes yield scales ranging 
from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more political engagement.
The descriptive statistics show that while the overall levels of political 
participation among foreigners are low, they are not very different from par-
ticipation levels among natives. As expected, immigrants are more likely to 
engage in uninstitutionalized than in institutionalized political acts: The aver-
age scores among foreigners are .42 and .24, respectively.7 Looking at the 
underlying distribution of reported acts, 81.3% of foreign-born reported that 
they had not engaged in a single institutionalized act, while 18.7% said they 
participated in at least one. Similarly, about 71% of foreign-born respondents 
said they had not engaged in any uninstitutionalized acts, 19% indicated they 
had participated in one, and 2.3% reported that they been involved in all 
reported unconventional activities.
Independent Variables
Opinion Climates. Our key independent variable—the opinion climate toward 
immigrants—is based on three survey questions (cf. Schneider, 2008). 
Respondents were asked whether immigration was bad or good for their 
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country’s economy, whether immigrants undermined or enriched the coun-
try’s cultural life, and whether immigrants made the country a worse or better 
place to live. Using answers to these questions measured on a scale from 0 to 
10, we first calculated an average score for each respondent,8 and this score 
was then used to compute a country mean among natives (calculated for each 
ESS round). To be able to generalize beyond the national-level indicator, we 
also calculated a regional measure of opinion climate toward immigrants.9
Figure 1 shows the average levels of national openness toward immi-
grants in 25 European countries. Theoretically, the scale ranges from 0 to 10, 
with higher values indicating more favorable opinion climates toward immi-
grants. We find that the numbers in our sample of European countries range 
from 3.37 in Greece to 6.12 in Sweden, with an average value of 5.02. New 
democracies—Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia—exhibit more 
anti-immigrant climates than other countries, but they are not much behind 
the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Italy. At the upper end of the distribu-
tion, we find not only some Scandinavian countries, such as Finland and 
Sweden, but also Poland and Bulgaria.
Foreign-Born. To identify foreigners in the ESS data, we relied on the survey 
question: “Were you born in this country?” Respondents who did not give a 
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Figure 1. Pro-immigrant opinion climate in 25 European Democracies, 2002 to 
2010.
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positive response were coded as foreign-born. Pooling data across countries 
generates a sample of 11,985 foreign-born individuals (7.34% of all survey 
respondents).10 Because our individual-level analyses are based on samples 
of foreign-born respondents only, we sought to establish to what extent these 
samples matched the characteristics of the populations under investigation by 
conducting several analyses. First, we calculated the percentages of foreign-
ers in the survey sample and compared these with data measuring the actual 
percentages of foreigners collected by the European Union’s statistical 
agency, Eurostat.11 The Pearson correlation between the two measures was 
.97, indicating an extremely close fit between survey and official statistics. 
Second, using a question indicating respondents’ country of origin, we inves-
tigated the extent to which our samples of foreign-born were representative 
of populations in the countries under investigation by calculating the percent-
ages of individuals from different regions of the world: Africa, Asia, the Bal-
kans, East Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, 
Australia and New Zealand, and Western Europe. The Pearson correlation 
was .90, indicating yet again a very close fit between survey and official 
statistics.12
Political Dissatisfaction. To measure immigrants’ political grievances, we relied 
on the following survey question: “On the whole, how satisfied are you with 
the way democracy works in [country]?” To facilitate the interpretation of 
our results, we reversed the original survey scale, ranging from 0 to 10, so 
that higher values indicate higher levels of dissatisfaction with democracy. 
Using Easton’s categories, this indicator has been validated as a measure of 
support for the performance of the political regime, rather than support for 
democracy as an ideal (cf. Klingemann, 1999; Linde & Ekman, 2003; Norris, 
1999).
Control Variables
Our multivariate analyses include a range of control variables past research 
has identified as consistent determinants of political engagement. At the level 
of individuals, we include a standard set of demographic variables (age, gen-
der, marital status) as well as measures of people’s socioeconomic resources 
and status (income, education, and employment). We also control for social 
connectedness, union membership, political interest, as well as experiences 
of discrimination and crime. To capture immigrant-specific experiences, we 
used democracy level in the respondent’s country of origin, duration of stay 
in the host country, and citizenship status. At the macro level, we control for 
a country’s economic prosperity and growth, the size of foreign-born 
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population, participation levels among natives, and democratic experience. 
Finally, because we rely on a four-wave cumulative data, we include fixed 
effects for ESS rounds. Details on coding procedures for all variables are 
listed in the appendix.
Estimation and Results
Because our analysis requires that we combine information collected at the 
level of individuals and countries, our data set has a multilevel structure 
(where one level, the individual, is nested within the other, the country). To 
avoid a number of statistical problems associated with such a data structure 
(clustering, nonconstant variance, underestimation of standard errors, etc.; 
cf. Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002), we rely on mul-
tilevel models. Because our lower unit of analysis (foreigner) is nested 
within two macrolevel units of analysis (foreigner’s host country and coun-
try of origin), we estimated our multilevel models with crossed random 
intercepts.
Table 1 reports the results for institutionalized and uninstitutionalized 
political acts among foreign-born. The analyses reveal that foreigners who 
are dissatisfied with democracy and enjoy a more favorable opinion cli-
mate are more likely to engage in politics. The results are consistent using 
regional and national measures of opinion climates, but the impact is lim-
ited to uninstitutionalized political action. In other words, institutionalized 
political acts do not appear to be driven by a country’s political climate 
toward migrants.13,14
To assess how much opinion climates and dissatisfaction with democracy 
contribute to immigrant political participation in substantive terms, Figure 2 
plots the marginal effects for uninstitutionalized participation, using national 
and regional measures of opinion climates. The black bars indicate the levels 
of uninstitutionalized acts among foreigners who are completely dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works in their host country, the white bars indicate 
participation among foreigners who are fully satisfied, when we compare 
countries with low and high levels of pro-immigrant opinion climate (calcu-
lated as 1 SD below and above the mean); the vertical lines mark the 95% 
confidence intervals.15
The results using the national opinion climate measure reveal that the 
uninstitutionalized participation score of a foreigner who is extremely dis-
satisfied with democracy and resides in a country with a relatively friendly 
opinion climate toward migrants is .255 higher than the participation score 
of an individual who lives in a similarly friendly environment but has no 
political grievances (.403 vs. .148). Moreover, a foreigner who is politically 
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Figure 2. Marginal effects of pro-immigrant opinion climate and satisfaction 
with democracy among foreigners on their uninstitutionalized political action: (a) 
national and (b) regional.
Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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dissatisfied and resides in a country with pro-immigrant opinion climate is 
more politically engaged than a similarly dissatisfied foreigner living in a 
hostile climate: The respective scores are .403 versus .315. The pattern is 
even more pronounced when we consider the results with the regional opin-
ion climate measure: The scores of uninstitutionalized political action 
among foreigners increase from .187 to .444 when we compare respondents 
with the lowest and highest levels of political grievances in regions with 
favorable opinion climates toward immigrants, while this difference is 
reduced to .121 among foreigners living in regions that are relatively unwel-
coming to immigrants. Taken together, our results suggest that the opinion 
climate toward immigrants has an important mobilizing effect on uninstitu-
tionalized political action among foreigners with political grievances, and 
this effect operates at the level of countries and regions in European 
democracies.
Robustness Checks:  
An Instrumental Variable Approach
One difficulty with estimating the effects of opinion climates on immigrant 
political engagement is that opinion climates might change as a result of 
immigrant political action, creating an endogeneity problem. Moreover, the 
relationship between the opinion climate and immigrant political action 
might be spurious, if some unobserved heterogeneity not captured by our 
data is driving both variables. To test the robustness of our findings, and 
hence to ensure that our results are not affected by endogeneity or omitted 
variable bias, we rely on a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach 
(Baum, 2006, chap. 8; Wooldridge, 2009, chap. 15). The IV approach works 
under the assumption that valid instruments can be identified. This means 
that instruments must have a significant partial correlation with opinion 
climate, controlling for all the other determinants of political participation, 
while being uncorrelated with the error term in the model of political 
participation.
We argue that unemployment levels and immigrant integration policies 
can be used as such instruments. Threat in labor market competition has 
been long thought to be a prime motivator behind anti-immigration attitudes 
(Fetzer, 2000; Money, 1999; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). We therefore 
include a percentage of unemployed to predict levels of pro-immigrant opin-
ion climate, with an expectation that higher unemployment in an immigrant 
receiving country engenders more hostility toward newcomers than low 
unemployment.
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Existing research also shows that immigrant integration laws—most nota-
bly, citizenship policies—play an important role in shaping majority popula-
tions’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities and migrants (Weldon, 2006). And 
while the relationship between institutions and opinion climate may not be 
unidirectional, existing evidence suggests that the main causal pathway runs 
from institutions to people’s opinions about immigrants: State policy regimes 
communicate to majority populations values and norms regarding the posi-
tion and expected behavior of migrants in their host society, and people tend 
to acquire these values through a process of socialization in the family, edu-
cation system, workplace, and the media (Weldon, 2006).16 We use two mea-
sures of policy regimes: the Citizenship Policy Index (Howard, 2009) and the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), with an expectation that more 
liberal laws are positively linked to natives’ opinion toward immigrants.
The first stage of the IV estimation predicts opinion climates toward 
immigrants using our instruments while controlling for all variables specified 
in the model of political participation among foreign-born. Because the IV 
approach does not allow for multilevel modeling, we include fixed effects for 
countries and ESS rounds, and estimate our models using robust standard 
errors (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009). The second stage then uses the 
Table 2. Predicting Pro-immigrant Opinion Climate Toward Immigrants in 25 
European Countries, 2002 to 2010.
Independent variables
With national pro-immigrant opinion 
climate
With regional pro-immigrant 
opinion climate
% unemployed in host 
country
−.036**** (.002) −.036**** (.001) −.029**** (.002) −.029**** (.002)
Citizenship policy index .128**** (.002) — .125*** (.007) —
MIPEX — .022**** (.000) — .022**** (001)
Included exogenous 
individual-level 
regressors
Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
ESS round fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of countries 25 25
Partial R2 for excluded 
instruments
.29 .06
F statistic for test of 
excluded instruments
1,924.7 211.1
F p value .000 .000
ESS = European Social Survey; MIPEX = Migrant Integration Policy Index. The results are 2SLS first-stage 
coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses).
**p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.
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instrumented opinion climate as an independent variable in the models of 
political participation among foreign-born.17
As opinion climate is hypothesized to interact with dissatisfaction with 
democracy in shaping immigrant political action, we had to make one addi-
tional modification to our model. Both stages in the IV models are estimated 
simultaneously, preventing us from generating a multiplicative term with 
instrumented opinion climate produced between the two stages. An alterna-
tive way of dealing with independent variables that are hypothesized to have 
an interactive effect with another independent variable is to stratify the sam-
ple into two subsamples (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977, p. 101; Jusko & 
Shively, 2005). We therefore split our sample between foreigners who are 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their host country and those who 
are not, using the median value of this variable among foreign-born to ensure 
that both samples are of similar size.18 If our hypothesis of the interactive 
effect is correct, we should observe a positive and statistically significant 
effect of opinion climates on political participation among politically dissat-
isfied foreigners, especially with respect to uninstitutionalized political acts, 
and a smaller or insignificant effect among those who are satisfied with the 
political system.
The first stage of the IV estimations, reported in Table 2, indicates that all 
instruments have the anticipated signs and are significantly correlated with 
pro-immigrant opinion climates. We find that, controlling for all predictors of 
immigrant political participation as well as country and survey fixed effects, 
liberal immigrant integration policies contribute positively to a pro-immi-
grant opinion climate while unemployment undermines it. To systematically 
assess the validity of our instruments, we rely on several test statistics.19 First, 
the F statistic for the test of excluded instruments is equal to 1,924.7 in the 
model with national opinion climate, and 211.1—with regional opinion cli-
mate, and both are statistically significant at less than .001, indicating that our 
instruments are jointly significant. Furthermore, the Hansen J-test statistic in 
the models reported in Table 3 is statistically insignificant, showing that the 
instruments are appropriately uncorrelated with the error term in the second-
stage estimations. Taken together, the results indicate that the selected instru-
ments are relevant and statistically independent from the disturbance process, 
satisfying the key requirements of valid instruments of the IV approach.
The results of the second stage estimations, shown in Table 3, are in line 
with the multilevel results reported above. As before, we find that pro-
immigrant opinion climates have a positive effect on immigrant political 
participation, but this effect is more pronounced among foreigners who are 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their host country. However, as 
before, we find that the impact of opinion climates is limited to 
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uninstitutionalized political acts. Finally, the results are consistent using 
national and regional measures of opinion climates, although the regional 
effect is slightly stronger than the national one. Taken together, the IV results 
confirm that the opinion climate toward immigrants has a genuine and robust 
effect on political action among foreigners.
Discussion
To better understand the consequences that a society’s opinions about immi-
grants have on the patterns of immigrants’ political engagement in European 
democracies, our article focused on several important but unanswered ques-
tions in previous research: Does political engagement among the foreign-born 
depend on the opinion climate toward immigrants in their host country? Does 
the degree of hostility or hospitality affect the kinds of political acts immigrants 
engage in? And, finally, does the opinion climate shape the extent to which 
political grievances translate into political engagement among foreign-born?
We argue that a more comprehensive explanation of political engagement 
among immigrants requires not only the consideration of information about 
individual attributes, experiences, and attitudes or formal political institu-
tions, rules, and political allies, but also taking into account the social context 
in which immigrants engage politically. As such, this study builds on a grow-
ing body of literature that seeks to develop multilevel models of political 
behavior designed to systematically incorporate information about individu-
als and the context they are exposed to (Anderson, 2007) and contributes to it 
by focusing on informal, rather than formal constraints on political action. 
We argue that positive opinion climates toward immigrants—at the national 
and regional level—increase the willingness of foreigners to engage in unin-
stitutionalized political acts. Moreover, we find that the effect of opinion cli-
mates on uninstitutionalized participation is particularly pronounced among 
immigrants dissatisfied with the political system’s performance in their coun-
try of residence.
The conclusion that a friendly environment fosters the translation of 
immigrants’ political discontent into political action is limited to uninstitu-
tionalized political acts. It also may not be congenial to everyone. But recall 
that the kinds of political acts analyzed here are legal and nonviolent. When 
aggrieved, immigrants appear to channel their frustrations into nonviolent, 
albeit uninstitutionalized political action, particularly in countries with 
majority populations who hold more positive opinions about immigrants. At 
a minimum, these results indicate that there is good reason to believe that a 
hospitable environment can counteract immigrants’ political grievances from 
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going unexpressed, and this may ultimately prevent more violent expressions 
of such sentiments.
Appendix
Measures and Coding
Institutionalized political action. Additive index of three survey items:
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent 
things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the 
following? 1) contacted a politician, government or local government official, 2) 
worked in a political party or action group, 3) worked in another organization or 
association?
The resulting ordinal variable ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicat-
ing more involvement in institutionalized political acts.
Uninstitutionalized political action. Additive index of three survey items:
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent 
things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the 
following? 1) signed a petition? 2) taken part in a lawful public demonstration? 3) 
boycotted certain products?
The resulting ordinal variable ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicat-
ing more involvement in uninstitutionalized political acts.
National opinion climate toward immigrants. Country mean of three survey 
questions: (a) “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country’s] 
economy that people come to live here from other countries?” (b) “Would 
you say that [country’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by 
people coming to live here from other countries?” (c) “Is [country] made a 
worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other coun-
tries?” (Each item ranges from 0 = “most anti-immigrant” attitude to 10 = 
“most pro-immigrant” attitude.) We first calculated an average based on these 
three items for each respondent; this individual average was then used to 
calculate the country mean (for each ESS round) among natives.
Regional opinion climate toward immigrants. Mean calculated as above, only 
at a regional level using ESS region variables (in each country and ESS 
round).
Dissatisfaction with democracy. “And on the whole, how satisfied are you 
with the way democracy works in [country]?” 0 = “extremely satisfied,” 10 = 
“extremely dissatisfied.”
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Citizen. “Are you a citizen of [country]?” 1 = “yes,” 0 = “otherwise.”
Discriminated against. “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a 
group that is discriminated against in this country?” 1 = “yes,” 0 = “no.”
Crime victim. “Have you or a member of your household been the victim of 
a burglary or assault in the past 5 years?” 1 = “yes,” 0 = “no.”
Recent immigrant. “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?” 5 
= “within the past year,” 4 = “1 to 5 years ago,” 3 = “6 to 10 years ago,” 2 = 
“11 to 20 years ago,” 1 = “more than 20 years ago.”
Democracy in country of origin. Based on survey questions: “Were you born 
in [country]?” If a respondent said “no,” then the follow-up question was “In 
which country were you born?” and “How long ago did you first come to live 
in [country]?” Information about immigrant country of origin and the recency 
of immigrant arrival were then matched up with the polity scores from the 
Polity IV data set http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Because recency of 
immigrant arrival is a categorical variable that captures only approximate 
number of years in host country, the variable was calculated in the following 
way: If a survey was conducted in 2002, then those who arrived more than 20 
years ago were assigned the average value of the 1972 to 1981 polity score in 
their country of origin; those who arrived 11 to 20 years ago, the 1982 to 1991 
score; those who arrived 6 to 10 years ago, the 1992 to 1996 score; those who 
arrived 1 to 5 years ago, the 1997 to 2001 score; and those who arrived within 
the past year, the 2002 score. We then calculated values separately for respon-
dents interviewed in 2003, 2004, etc. This resulting variable ranges from 0 
“least democratic regime” to 20 “most democratic regime” (recoded from the 
original polity measure that ranges from −10 to 10).
Political interest. “How interested would you say you are in politics?” 0 = 
“not at all interested,” 1 = “hardly interested,” 2 = “quite interested,” 3 = 
“very interested.”
Married. 1 = “married,” 0 = “otherwise.”
Male. 1 = “male,” 0 = “female.”
Age. Number of years, calculated by subtracting respondent’s year of birth 
from the year of interview.
Income. “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you 
feel about your household’s income nowadays?” 0 = “very difficult on pres-
ent income,” 1 = “difficult on present income,” 2 = “coping on present 
income,” 3 = “living comfortably on present income.”
Education. The highest level of education achieved.
Social connectedness. “How often do you meet socially with friends, rela-
tives, or work colleagues?” 1 = “never,” 2 = “less than once a month,” 3 = 
“once a month,” 4 = “several times a month,” 5 = “once a week,” 6 = “several 
times a week,” 7 = “every day.”
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Unemployed. Based on two survey questions: “Which of these descriptions 
applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days?” (a) unemployed and 
actively looking for a job; (b) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively 
looking for a job. Dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if a respondent gave a 
positive answer to at least one question, 0 = otherwise.
Union member. “Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or 
similar organization?” 1 = “is/was a union member,” 0 = “never been.”
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Based on purchasing power par-
ity (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars (in 1000s). Source: World 
Bank (2011).
Economic growth. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. Source: 
World Bank (2011).
% Foreign-born in host country. Source: Eurostat 2001 Census Data.
Participation level among natives. Country-round mean of institutionalized 
or uninstitutionalized political participation among natives.
% unemployed in host country. Source: World Bank (2011).
Citizenship Policy Index. Source: Howard (2009). Additive index based on 
whether a country grants jus soli citizenship, the minimum years of residency 
required for naturalization, and whether naturalized immigrants are allowed 
to hold dual citizenship. The variable ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values 
indicating more liberal citizenship policies.
MIPEX. Migrant Integration Policy Index (http://www.mipex.eu/) based on 
148 policy indicators of immigrants’ access to political participation, labor 
market mobility, education, family reunion, long-term residence, citizenship, 
and antidiscrimination protection. The variable ranges from 0 (most restric-
tive immigrant integration policies) to 100 (most inclusive).
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Notes
 1. Because political engagement can be considered an individual act—indi-
viduals cast ballots—as well as a social one—individuals protest together—
it is useful to think of individual and contextual variables that may shape 
participation.
958 Comparative Political Studies 47(7)
 2. While grievances are known to be a necessary condition for protest (McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996), they are not sufficient: Only a small proportion of 
the people holding those grievances usually participate in a movement, as par-
ticipation tends to be conditioned by individual characteristics (Dalton, 2006; 
McAdam, 1988), movements’ nature, and political environment (McAdam, 
1982; Meyer, 2006).
 3. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) suggest defining “opportunity” as the probability that 
social protest actions will lead to success in achieving the desired outcome. In 
contrast, “threat” is best conceptualized as the costs that a social group will incur 
from protest, or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action (p. 183).
 4. It is based on hour-long face-to-face interviews using survey questions designed 
for optimal cross-national comparability and strict random sampling of individu-
als aged 15 or older regardless of nationality, citizenship, language, or legal sta-
tus to ensure representativeness of national populations.
 5. Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine were excluded because of missing values on 
the immigrant integration policy variables.
 6. Voting is not included because many foreign-born are not citizens and therefore 
do not have a legal right to vote in national elections.
 7. The respective scores for natives are .45 and .34. Hence, uninstitutionalized par-
ticipation is higher than institutionalized political acts among natives and for-
eigners, but the gap in the levels of these activities is higher among foreigners 
than among natives.
 8. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is .84.
 9. Our measure of opinion climate toward immigrants can be seen as an “objec-
tive” measure in a sense that it is based on natives’ attitudes, rather than 
immigrants’ perceptions of those attitudes. We recognize that a more direct “sub-
jective” measure of opinion climate would be more appropriate for our analy-
ses. Unfortunately, such measure is not available in the European Social Survey 
(ESS) data, and we are not aware of any other survey that includes it.
10. Foreign-born with native-born parents were excluded from the analyses, although 
including them does not affect our findings.
11. We relied on the 2001 Census data, and compared it with the most proximate 
round of surveys—ESS1 collected from 2002 to 2003.
12. We are not the first to rely on the samples of foreign-born to study immigrant 
behavior: See, for example, Wright and Bloemraad (2012), de Rooij (2012), and 
Maxwell (2010).
13. To test the robustness of our findings, we reestimated our models using (a) opin-
ion climate based on natives without second generation immigrants and (b) over-
all measure of openness toward immigrants based on the attitudes of natives and 
foreigners (results available upon request). Using these alternative measures of 
opinion climate does not change our findings appreciably and our inferences 
remain the same.
14. It is worth noting that this contrasts with the patterns of political engagement 
among natives among whom negative attitudes toward government go hand 
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in hand with political disengagement. In our data set too, dissatisfaction with 
democracy is negatively correlated with institutionalized and uninstitutionalized 
political action among natives (−.1 for institutionalized and −.07 for uninstitu-
tionalized engagement).
15. We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous variables—at their 
medians.
16. Wright (2011) makes a similar argument when analyzing the consequences of 
liberal citizenship laws and welfare state on the conceptions of inclusive concep-
tions of national identity (see also Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010).
17. The inclusion of country fixed effects requires that we drop substantive macro-
level controls previously used in multilevel models due to collinearity.
18. The median value is 4 on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating a 
more dissatisfied response.
19. For a similar approach, see Gabel & Scheve (2007).
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